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THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

Conversion-Refusal of Administrator to Deliver Stock Certificate Until
Ownership is Determined.-The temporary administrators of a decedent's estate
found six stock certificates, each reijresenting one hundred shares, in the
decedent's safe deposit box. On its face, one certificate showed that a third
party was the owner of the stock represented by the certificate. The administrators delivered this certificate, along with the others, to the depositary named by
the court as custodian for the funds of the estate. The plaintiff, who claimed
under the third party, demanded the surrender of the certificate. The administrators refused to surrender it, not claiming that the decedent owned it, or denying that the plaintiff owned it, but merely asserting the right of temporary
custody until title to it could be established by court proceedings. The
plaintiff brought an action against the administrators for conversion. His
complaint was dismissed; the Appellate Division reversed this decision, but the
Court of Appeals sustained the trial court. Held, that when a person is rightfully in possession of property, refusal to deliver on demand of the owner
until he proves his right constitutes no conversion. The owner is wronged by
the custodian only where there is a defiance of the owner's right to exercise
dominion and control over the property. Bradley v. Roe et al., 282 N.Y. 525,
27 N.E. (2d) 35 (1940).
It is generally held not to be a conversion when the rightful custodian refuses
to deliver property because he does not know that the claimant is the true owner.
Wood v. Pierson,45 Mich. 313, 7 N.W. 888 (1881) ; Zachary v. Pace, 9 Ark. 212
(1848). But there must be a reasonable doubt of the claimant's title. Zachary v.
Pace, supra. And any qualified refusal while ownership is determined, must be
made in good faith. Anything raising a question of the custodian's good faith
is evidence of a conversion. Obodov v. Foster,97 P. (2d) 426 (1939) ; Flannery
v. Brewer, 66 Mich. 509, 33 N.W. 522 (1887).
The possessor of the chattel may properly refuse to deliver it until he determines the facts of its ownership, Schoenborn v. Williams et al., 83 Mont. 477,
272 Pac. 992 (1928); Flannery v. Brewer, supra, and no conversion can be inferred, unless the refusal is unreasonably prolonged. Bufington v. Clarke, 15
R.I. 437, 8 Atl. 247 (1887). If he sets up title in someohie else, his case must stand
or fall by that title. Rogers v Weir, 34 N.Y. 463 (1865).
The custodian who refuses to deliver because he is in doubt as to some
question of law is a converter, according to decisions in the majority of jurisdictions. Churchill v. Welsh, 47 Wis. 39, 1 N.W. 398 (1879); Ray v. Light, 34
68 (1875). But
Ark. 421 (1879); American Express Co. v. Greenhalgh, 80 Ill.
New Hampshire and Michigan hold that he may properly refuse to deliver the
chattel until he ascertains some question of law. Felcher v. McMillan, 1W3 Mich.
494, 61 N.W. 791 (1895) ; Fletcher v. Fletcher,7 N.H. 452 (1835).
Whether the custodian is bound to submit the chattel to the claimant for
inspection depends upon the circumstances, and is a jury question. Wood v.
Pierson, 45 Mich. 313, 7 N.W. 888 (1881). The jury may also find that a demand
for a receipt before the property is returned is reasonable, and not a conversion.
Lander v. Bechtel, 55 Wis. 593, 13 N.W. 483 (1882).
If the one claiming the property says he is the agent of the owner, the custodian may refuse to deliver the chattel until the claimant proves his agency.
Blankenship v. Berry, 28 Tex. 449 (1866) ; Ingalls v. Buckley, supra. A request
that the demandant consult the possessor's attorney "whom he was under no
obligation to consult, was equivalent to a refusal to deliver the goods" and is
a conversion according to a decision of the Arkansas court, Ray v. Light, supra,
while Michigan has held a similar request to be no conversion. Felcher v. Mc-
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Millan, supra. A refusal to let the true owner remove his property from the
custodian's land was held to be a conversion by the North Carolina court, Nichols
v. Newsom, 6 N.C. 302 (1813), and not a conversion by the Indiana court.
Chicago L & L. Ry. Co. v. Pope, 99 Ind. App. 280, 188 N.E. 594 (1934). In both
cases the goods were on the land through no fault of their owner.
An absolute refusal to deliver property known to be the property of the
claimant was not a conversion, according to a New Hampshire decision, when
the claimant could reasonably infer from the circumstances and from the acts
of the defendant that refusal, though absolute in form, was in fact meant to
be qualified. Stahl v. Boston & M. R. R., 71 N.H. 57, 51 Atl. 176 (1901).
The rightful custodian of property may refuse to deliver it until he has had
a reasonable time to determine its ownership. Twenty-four hours was held te
be a reasonable time in a Michigan case. Fletcher v. McMillan, supra. Twelve
days was held reasonable in a Rhode Island case, Buffington v. Clarke, supra,
twenty-two days, in a Missouri decision, St. Louis Fixture & Show Case Co. v.
F. W. Woolworth Co., 232 Mo. App. 10, 88 S.W. (2d) 254 (1935), and thirty
days was a reasonable time in a Nebraska controversy. Farming Corporation et
al. v. Bridgeport Bank, 113 Neb. 323, 202 N.W. 911 (1925). If the refusal is unreasonably prolonged, it is a conversion, Bufington v. Clarke, supra, but in such
cases where defendant's conduct has been held a conversion, the decisions have
frequently been based on grounds other than the length of time during which
the defendant held the property after the demand. Flannery v. Brewer, supra;
Obodov v. Foster,supra.
WILLIAM J. SLOAN.

Fixtures-Effect of a New Lease on Agreement Between Landlord and

Tenant to Consider a Fixture as Personal Property of the Tenant.-Under an
agreement in a lease, a warehouse erected on the property of the landlord by
the tenant was to remain the personal property of the tenant. After this original
lease expired the tenant was given a new lease which did not by its terms reserve
this right of removal to the tenant, who wished to move and take his warehouse
with him. The landlord sought an injunction restraining the tenant from removing the warehouse, contending that title to the warehouse vested in him upon the
expiration of the first lease. Held, that this occupancy of the premises by the
tenant constituted one continuous tenancy and the new lease was intended merely
to provide for further occupancy of the premises. The mere execution of a
new lease should not change the ownership of property under a continuous
tenancy. Scriven v. Bailey, 290 N.W. 486 (S.D. 1940).
The holding in this case is contrary to what is known as the majority or
forfeiture rule, but it is indicative of the modern trend to depart from the older
and more artificial rule.
A resident of Illinois, a state which still adheres to the forfeiture rule, built
a barn and stables on land held by him under a lease. When this lease expired
a new one was entered into which contained no provision for the removal of
these barns and stables at the termination of the tenancy. The question arose
as to who was entitled to recover the value of these structures on a condemnation proceeding. It was held that the acceptance of the new lease without the
reservation of the right to remove in effect acknowledged the right of the landlord to the fixtures and that the tenant was estopped from denying this right.
Sanitary District of Chicago v. Cook, 169 11. 184, 48 N.E. 461 (1897).
Under a set of facts similar to those in the principal case, a court in a
jurisdiction applying the forfeiture rule held that the acceptance of the new
lease on different terms was the creation of a new tenancy, which was to be

